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Abstract— In this paper the proposed system 
adds a layer of accountability to any publicly known 
anonymizing network is proposed. Servers can blacklist 
misbehaving users while maintaining their privacy, and 
this system shows that how these properties can be 
attained in a way that is practical, efficient, and
sensitive to the needs of both users and services. This 
work will increase the mainstream acceptance of 
anonymizing networks such as Tor, which has, thus far, 
been completely blocked by several services because of 
users who abuse their anonymity. In future the Nymble 
system can be extended to support Subnet-based 
blocking. If a user can obtain multiple addresses, then 
nymble-based and regular IP-address blocking not
supported. In such a situation subnet-based blocking is
used. Other resources include email addresses, client 
puzzles and e-cash, can be used, which could provide 
more privacy. The system can also enhanced by 
supporting for  varying time periods.
Index Terms—Screened networks, Subnet based
blocking,privacy,revocation
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of networking, the area of network
security consists of the provisions and policies adopted by
the network administrator to prevent and monitor
unauthorized access, misuse, modification, or denial of the 
computer network and network-accessible resources. 
Network security involves the authorization of access to data 
in a network, which is controlled by the network 
administrator. Users choose or are assigned an ID and
password or other authenticating information that allows
them access to information and programs within their 
authority. Network security covers a variety of computer 
networks, both public and private, that are used in everyday
jobs conducting transactions and communications among
businesses, government agencies and individuals. Networks
can be private, such as within a company, and others which
might be open to public access. Network security is 
involved in organizations, enterprises, and other types of
institutions. It does as its title explains: It secures the 
network, as well as protecting and overseeing operations 
being done.
In today’s technological world, millions of 
individuals are subject to privacy threats. Companies are 
hired not only to watch what you visit online, but to infiltrate 
the information and send advertising based on your 
browsing history. People set up accounts for facebook,enter 
bank and credit card information to various websites.
Those concerned about Internet privacy often cite
a number of privacy risks events that can compromise
privacy which may be encountered through Internet use.
These methods of compromise can range from the gathering 
of statistics on users, to more malicious acts such as the 
spreading of spyware and various forms of bugs (software
errors) exploitation.Privacy measures are provided on 
several social networking sites to try to provide their users 
with protection for their personal information. On facebook 
for example privacy settings are available for all registered 
users. The settings available on facebook include the ability 
to block certain individuals from seeing your profile, the 
ability to choose your "friends," and the ability to limit who 
has access to your pictures and  videos. Privacy settings are 
also available on other social networking sites such as 
E-harmony and MySpace.
People  with only  a  casual  concern  for  Internet   
privacy   need   not  achieve total anonymity. Internet users 
may achieve an adequate level of privacy through controlled 
disclosure of personal information. The revelation of IP 
addresses, non-personally- identifiable profiling, and similar 
information might become acceptable trade-offs for the 
convenience that users could otherwise lose using the 
workarounds needed to suppress such details rigorously. On
the other hand, some people desire much stronger privacy.
In that case, they may try to achieve Internet anonymity to 
ensure privacy, use of the Internet without giving any third 
parties the ability to link the Internet activities to personally-
identifiable information (P.I.I.) of the Internet user. In order 
to keep their information private, people need to be careful
on what they submit and look at online. When filling out 
forms and buying merchandise, that becomes tracked and
because the information was not private, companies are now 
sending Internet users spam and advertising on similar 
products.
Information security means protecting information 
and information systems from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, perusal, inspection,
recording or destruction. The terms information security, 
computer security and information assurance are frequently 
incorrectly used interchangeably. These fields are 
interrelated often and share the common goals of protecting 
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information; 
however, there are some subtle differences between them.
                                                                                                                                        ISSN (ONLINE) : 2395-695X
ISSN (PRINT) : 2395-695X
Available online at www.ijarbest.com
                    
                            
            International Journal of Advanced Research in Biology, Ecology, Science and Technology (IJARBEST)
            Vol. 1, Issue 4, July 2015
11
                                                                  All Rights Reserved © 2015 IJARBEST
These differences lie primarily in the
approach to the subject, the methodologies used,   and   the  
areas   of   concentration.   Information   security   is   
concerned   with the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of data regardless of the form the data may take: 
electronic, print, or other forms. Computer security can
focus on ensuring the availability and correct operation of
a computer system without concern for the information
stored or processed by the computer.Governments, military, 
corporations, financial institutions, hospitals, and private 
businesses amass a great deal of confidential information 
about their employees, customers, products, research, and 
financial status. Most of this information is now collected,
processed and stored on electronic computers and 
transmitted across networks to other computers.
Confidential information about a business' 
customers or finances or new product line fall into the hands 
of a competitor, such a breach of security could lead to lost 
business, law suits or even bankruptcy of the business.
Protecting confidential information is a business 
requirement, and in many cases also an ethical and legal
requirement. The field of information security has grown 
and evolved significantly in recent years. There are many
ways of gaining entry into the field as a career. It offers
many areas for specialization including: securing network(s) 
and allied infrastructure, securing applications and
databases, security testing, information systems auditing,
business continuity planning and digital forensics science, 
etc.
Anonymity is a result of not having identifying
characteristics (such as a name or description of physical
appearance) disclosed. This can occur from a lack of
interest in learning the nature of such characteristics, or 
through intentional efforts to hide these characteristics. An
example of the former would include a brief encounter with
a stranger, when learning the other person's name is not
deemed necessary. An example of the latter would include 
someone hiding behind clothing that covers identifying 
features like hair color, scars, or tattoos, in order to avoid 
identification. Anonymity may also be created through a 
gradual eroding of ownership information, such as the 
passage of time and loss of attribution to a saying. For 
example, the quote, "Ignorance is Bliss" originally had a
known author, but, over time, information on author's 
identity was obscured and has disappeared. Anonymizer
provides fast, anonymous, interactive communication 
services. Anonymizer in this approach is essentially a web 
proxy that filters out the identifying headers and source
addresses from web client requests. Instead of a user’s true 
identity, a web server can only learn the identity of the
Anonymizer- Server. In this approach, all rerouting paths 
have a single intermediate node, which is the 
Anonymizer-Server. Anonymous Remailer is mainly used 
for e-mail anonymity. It uses rerouting of an e-mail through
a sequence of mail remailers, and then to the recipient such 
that the true origin of the e-mail can be hidden.
Tor aims to conceal its users' identities and their
network activity from surveillance and traffic analysis by 
separating identification and routing. It is an implementation 
of onion routing, which encrypts and then randomly
bounces communications through a network of relays run by 
volunteers throughout the globe. Tor operation shown 
Figure (2.4) .These onion routers employ encryption in a 
multi-layered manner (hence the onion  metaphor)   to 
ensure perfect forward secrecy between relays, thereby
providing users with anonymity in network location. That 
anonymity extends to the hosting of censorship-resistant 
content via Tor's anonymous hidden service feature. By 
keeping some of the entry relays secret (bridge relays), users 
can evade Internet censorship that relies upon blocking 
public Tor relays.
Because     the internet     address of     the     sender     
and      the      recipient  are not both in cleartext at any hop 
along the way (and at middle relays neither piece of 
information is in cleartext), someone eavesdropping at any
point along the communication channel cannot directly
identify both ends. Furthermore, to the recipient it appears
that the last Tor node (exit relay) is the originator of the 
communication rather than the sender. Users of a Tor
network run an onion proxy on their machine. The Tor
software periodically negotiates a virtual circuit through the 
Tor network, using multi-layer encryption, ensuring perfect 
forward secrecy. At the same time, the onion proxy software 
presents a SOCKS interface to its clients. SOCKS-aware 
applications may be pointed at Tor, which then multiplexes 
the traffic through a Tor virtual circuit. The Polipo proxy 
server can speak the SOCKS 4 & SOCKS 5 protocols and 
therefore is recommended to  be used together with the Tor 
anonymising network. Polipo is a web proxy that does 
HTTP 1.1 pipelining well, so it can enhance Tor's 
communication latency.
Once inside a Tor network, the traffic is sent from 
router to router, ultimately reaching an exit node at which 
point the clear text packet is available and is forwarded on to 
its original destination. Viewed from the destination, the
traffic appears to originate at the Tor exit node. Tor's 
application independence sets it apart from most other 
anonymity networks: it works at the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) stream level. Applications whose traffic is 
commonly anonymised using Tor include Internet Relay 
Chat (IRC), instant messaging and World Wide Web 
browsing. When browsing the Web, Tor is often coupled 
with Polipo or Privoxy proxy servers. Privoxy is a filtering
proxy server that aims to add privacy at the application
layer. Polipo can speak the SOCKS protocol and does
HTTP 1.1 pipelining for enhancing latencies, therefore is 
now recommended to be used together with the Tor 
anonymising network.
The aim of [1] is to provide backward
unlinkability means that even after a member is revoked, 
signatures produced by the member before the revocation
remain anonymous. Since signers have no load, signer’s cost 
are lower and this approach is suitable for mobile
environments. This paper focuses on the membership
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revocation. By adopting time intervals all 
signatures from an illegal person should be traced. Revoked
member remains excluded forever after revocation. By
reducing the revocation tokens data size the signer has to 
perform additional computations which result in 
communication and computational overhead. In this scheme 
the signature are constructed from elements of groups that
are created as multiplicative cyclic groups. It is better to
construct a signature from only elements of initial groups.
In [2], the accumulator scheme is used along with 
bilinear pairings thus it allows to create a constant size 
signatures and providing membership revocation to group 
signatures. The size of our group signatures with 
membership revocation is only half the size of the
well-known scheme, which does not provide membership
revocation. Accumulator scheme allows aggregation of a
large set of inputs into one constant-size value. There are 
three security requirements for ID-based ring signature 
schemes: Correctness, Unforgeability against Chosen 
Message, Group and Signer Attacks, and Unconditional 
Anonymity. The advantage of this method is creating
constant size signatures and another advantage of our group 
signature scheme is perfect trapdoor-freeness, which allows
sharing of public parameters among groups and 
organizations. The demerit of this paper is a need of more 
scalar multiplications for pairing operations.
In [3], a practical anonymous credential system that 
is based on the strong RSA assumption and the decisional 
Diffie-Hellman assumption modulo is proposed. To prevent 
misuse of anonymity, this scheme is the first to offer
optional anonymity revocation for particular transactions. 
The communication and computation costs of this method 
are small, thus introducing almost no overhead to realizing 
privacy in a credential system. Separability ensures they can 
choose the encryption keys that they are needed. The 
drawbacks are the system lacks in scalability and for each 
revocation operation more exponentiations needed. The 
computation complexity arise due to more exponentiation  
affects the storage of bits.
The protocol implemented in [ 4 ]  aimed to 
achieve mutual anonymity by constructing anonymous paths
automatically. This protocol reduces the cryptographic
overhead and there is no requirement on extra information
for constructing paths. The protocol described in this paper
is Rumor Riding (RR), a lightweight and non-path-based
mutual anonymity protocol for decentralized P2P systems. 
RR takes advantage of lower overhead by mainly using the
symmetric cryptographic algorithm. RR significantly 
increases the anonymity degree of a system. Random walk
mechanism increases the difficulty for attackers to trace
back to the initiator or responder. This mechanism is 
invulnerable to collaborating attack, timing attack, 
predecessor attack, traffic analysis and trace back attacks.
The throughput of an initiator query depends on the rumor 
generation speed.
[5]  provides a deep analysis of both the HTTP and 
BitTorrent protocols and its usage in terms of traffic size and 
number of connections but also depict how users behave on
top of Tor. This paper show that many Tor users do not
comply with the protocol, and rather prefer creating tunnels
making Tor acting as a simple (1- hop) SOCKS proxy. This 
provide the proof for showing that it is easy to circumvent
the bridges collection limits. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)
is mainly used in this method for the purposes of traffic 
shaping based on intrusion detection. The anonymization of 
the captured packets allows for preserving useful 
information. Using this method useless traffic is discarded. 
DPI is the most accurate and useful techniques to
characterize the traffic. It also tackle the problem of 
application identification through deep packet inspection. In
essence, more than half of the traffic carried over Tor is 
BitTorrent. It provide strong level of anonymity in favor of
lower latency. This technique is vulnerable to crawling in 
which the exit nodes collects identities.
II. PROPOSED SYSTEM
To limit the number of identities a user can obtain 
the Nymble system binds nymbles to resources that are
sufficiently difficult to obtain in great numbers. This
implementation use IP addresses as the resource and this 
scheme also generalizes to other resources such as email 
addresses, identity certificates, and trusted hardware. This 
system suggest some promising approaches based on
resource-based blocking since the aim is to create a real-
world deployment. The user must first contact the
Pseudonym Manager (PM) and demonstrate control over a 
resource; for IP-address blocking, the user must connect to 
the PM directly, as shown in Fig.4.1 Assume the PM has
knowledge about Tor routers, for example, and can ensure 
that users are communicating with it directly. Pseudonyms 
are  deterministically chosen based on the controlled 
resource, ensuring that the same pseudonym is always issued 
for the same resource. Note that the user does not disclose 
what server he or she intends to connect to, and the PM’s 
duties are limited to mapping IP addresses (or other 
resources) to pseudonyms. The user contacts the PM only 
once per linkability window.
After obtaining a pseudonym from the PM, the user 
connects to the Nymble Manager (NM) through the
anonymizing network, and requests nymbles for access to
a particular server.A user’s requests to the NM are therefore 
pseudonymous, and nymbles are generated using the user’s 
pseudonym and the server’s identity. These nymbles are thus 
specific to a particular user-server pair. Nevertheless, as 
long as the PM and the NM do not collude, the Nymble 
system cannot identify which user is connecting to what 
server; the NM knows only the pseudonym-server pair, and 
the PM knows only the user identity-pseudonym pair. To 
provide the requisite cryptographic protection and security 
properties, the NM encapsulates nymbles within nymble
tickets. Servers wrap seeds into linking tokens, and 
therefore, linking tokens being used to link future nymble
tickets.
If a user misbehaves, the server may link any future 
connection from this user within the current linkability 
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window (e.g., the same day). Consider Fig. 4.2 
as an example: A user connects and misbehaves at a server
during time period t* within linkability window w*. The
server later detects this misbehavior and complains to the
NM in time period tc (t*< tc <= tL) of the same linkability
window w*.As part of the complaint, the server presents the 
nimble ticket of the misbehaving user and obtains the 
corresponding seed from the NM. The server is then able to 
link future connections by the user in time periods tc; tc +1; 
. . . ; tL of the same linkability window w_ to the complaint. 
Therefore, once the server has complained about a user, that
user is blacklisted for the rest of the day, for example (the
linkability window). Note that the user’s connections in t1; 
t2; . . . ; t*; t*+ 1; . . . ; tc remain unlinkable (i.e., including
those since the misbehavior and until the time of
complaint). Even though misbehaving users can be blocked
from making connections in the future, the users’ past 
connections remain unlinkable, thus providing backward 
unlinkability and subjective blacklisting.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
Design Engineering deals with the various UML 
[Unified Modeling language] diagrams for the 
implementation of project. Design is a meaningful
engineering representation of a thing that is to be built.
Software design is a process through which the 
requirements are translated into representation of the
software. Design is the place where quality is rendered in
software engineering. Design is the means to accurately
translate customer requirements into finished product. A
user with identity uid must register with the PM once in
each likability window. To do so, the user initiates a type-
Basic channel to the PM, followed by the User Registration
protocol described below. A login generally requires the
user to enter two pieces of information, first a user name
and then a password. A user name, also referred to as an
account name, is a string (i.e., sequence of characters) that
uniquely identifies a user. User name can be the same as or 
related to the real names of users, or they can be completely 
arbitrary. A password is likewise a string, but it differs from 
a user name in that it is intended to be kept a secret that is 
known only to its use.
The user must first contact the Pseudonym
Manager (PM) and demonstrate control over a resource; for
IP-address blocking, the user must connect to the PM
directly. We assume the PM has knowledge about Tor
routers, and can ensure that users are communicating with 
it directly. Pseudonyms are deterministically chosen based 
on the controlled resource, ensuring that the same 
pseudonyms always issued for the same resource.
After obtaining a pseudonym from the PM, the user 
connects to the Nymble Manager (NM) through the
anonymizing network, and requests nymbles for access to
a particular server (such as Wikipedia). A user’s requests to
the NM are therefore pseudonymous, and nymbles are 
generated using the user’s pseudonym and the server’s 
identity. These nymbles are thus specific to a particular 
user-server pair.
Servers update their blacklists for the current time 
period for two purposes. First, as mentioned earlier, the 
server needs to provide the user with its blacklist (and
blacklist certificate) for the current time period during a
Nymble connection establishment. Second, the server needs 
to be able to blacklist the misbehaving users by processing 
the newly filed complaints (since last update).
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The user registration page is used for new user to 
login this application by providing full personal details. It 
checks the user name and password of particular  user and if  
it is valid then allow user to navigate into nymble 
system.
Fig.1. Pseudonym Generation
The above page represents pseudonym generation which are 
deterministically chosen based on the controlled resource and 
given to the user.
Fig.2.Ticket Generation
The user connects to the Nymble Manager through
the anonymizing network, and requests for nymble ticket
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for gaining access to a particular server. This
page generates nymble ticket for particular user-server 
pair.
Fig.3.Online Test
This is the Home page of user selected server and in 
this page user enter the nymble ticket and enter into online test 
application.
Fig.4. Blocked Message
Fig.5. Blacklist Status After Updation
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper the proposed system adds a layer of 
accountability to any publicly known anonymizing network 
is proposed. Servers can blacklist misbehaving users while 
maintaining their privacy, and this system shows that how 
these properties can be attained in a way that is practical,
efficient, and sensitive to the needs of both users and
services. This work will increase the mainstream acceptance 
of anonymizing networks such as Tor, which has, thus far, 
been completely blocked by several services because of 
users who abuse their anonymity. In future the Nymble 
system can be extended to support Subnet-based blocking. If 
a user can obtain multiple addresses, then nymble-based and 
regular IP-address blocking not supported. In such a
situation subnet-based blocking is used. Other resources
include email addresses, client puzzles and e-cash, can be 
used, which could provide more privacy. The system can 
also enhanced by supporting for  varying time periods.
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